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Abstract:
The regulated price mechanism in China’s power industry has attracted much criticism
because of its incapability to optimize the allocation of resources. To build an “open, orderly,
competitive and complete” power market system, the Chinese government launched an
unprecedented marketization reform in 2015 to deregulate the electricity price. This paper
examines the impact of the electricity price deregulation in the industry level. We first construct
two-stage dynamic game models by taking the coal and coal-fired power industries as the players.
Using the models, we compare analytically the equilibriums with and without electricity
regulation, and examine the changes in electricity price, electricity generation, coal price and coal
traded quantity. The theoretical analyses show that there are three intervals of the regulated
electricity sales prices which influence the impact of electricity price deregulation. Next, we
collect empirical data to estimate the parameters in the game models, and simulate the influence of
electricity deregulation on the two industries in terms of market outcome and industrial
profitability. Our results suggest that the actual regulated electricity price falls within the medium
interval of the theoretical results, which means the price deregulation will result in higher
electricity sales price but lower coal price, less coal traded amount and less electricity generation
amount. The robustness analysis shows that our results hold with respect to the electricity
generation efficiency and price elasticity of electricity demand.
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1. Introduction
The electricity price in China is heavily regulated, which reduces the price fluctuations and
guarantees the revenue for power supplier. The regulated price mechanism had successfully
guided investments in new power infrastructures to satisfy the increasing electricity demand along
with the fast economy growth during the past decades. For example, the electricity generation
volume in China increased from 267 TWh in 1978 to 6,495 TWh in 2017 (NBS, 2018). However,
the regulated price mechanism has also attracted much criticism because the price distortion harms
its capability to optimize resource allocation in the power industry, which thus brings deadweight
loss to the economy (Joskow, 2007).
Recognizing the negative consequences of the regulated price mechanism, the central
government of China has launched an unprecedented marketization reform on its power industry
since the release of the so-called “No. 9 Document” (NDRC, 2015) in March 2015, to build an
“open, orderly, competitive and complete” power market system. A series of supplementary
documents have also been put forward to guide the implementation of the reform. One of the core
tasks of the reform is to deregulate electricity price. Over the past two years, the electricity reform
has been promoted solidly by the central government, which aims to completely deregulate the
industrial electricity price in 2018 and to form the commercial electricity price in 2020 (NEA,
2016).
Compared with the ambitious target of the central government, however, the local
government seems to be less positive about the reform and thus the processes have been promoted
slowly. So far the price deregulation is mainly executed in the pilot “large users direct supply”
market, which consumed about 7.75 percent of the electricity in 2015 (NEA, 2017). Even for that
pilot market, the price is not completely marketized because some local governments use their
power to influence the market outcome, e.g., providing guidance in the traded volume and price.
One of the reasons that local governments are so conservative about the reform is that they lack
knowledge about how the reform will affect the local economy, especially under the situation of
nationwide economy slowdown. More specifically, when the coal and power industries are very
important to support the economy in many regions in terms of tax revenues, job creations, and
economic growth, as would be expected, local policy makers tend to be more cautious about the
reform before clearly understanding how local coal and electricity producers will react to the
deregulation of price mechanism.
Although the coal-fired power generation has been continually limited by China for the sake
of protecting the environment and upgrading the energy structure, it still plays an important role in
China’s electricity market, accounting for 71.8 percent of the total power generation in 2017 (NBS,
2018). Considering the coal-dominated energy structure in the foreseeable future (Lin et al., 2012),
the deregulation of electricity price will inevitably exert a huge impact on related industries,
especially the coal and coal-fired power industries.
The influence of electricity price deregulation depends on the supply-demand relationships of
the related markets. For example, if the currently regulated electricity sales price is at a very low
level, which implies a shortage in the electricity market, the price deregulation will raise the
electricity sales price to a higher level than the previous regulatory price, leading to an increase in
the profit of the power industry. On the contrary, if the currently regulated electricity sales price is
2
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so high that oversupply exists in the electricity market, which is a totally different case. Therefore,
it is necessary to distinguish the scenarios with low and high electricity sales price, to reflect the
different supply-demand relationships in the regulated markets.
To analyze the rational responses of the coal and coal-fired power generation industries to
electricity price deregulation, this study constructs game models to connect the two industries. In
the industry chain, the upstream coal production industry produces and sells coal to the coal-fired
power industry, and then the downstream power industry generates and sells electricity through
the grid network. This study builds up two-stage dynamic game models to characterize how the
coal production industry and the coal-fired power industry make strategic decisions at different
times, using coal trading price and traded quantity to indicate the game-theoretic interaction
between the two industries. By virtual of the game models, we compare the equilibrium outcomes
with and without electricity regulation, and examine the changes in electricity price, electricity
generation, coal price and coal traded quantity. Next, empirical data are collected and applied to
estimate the parameters in the game models, based on which the influence of electricity
deregulation on the two industries in terms of trading price, traded quantity and industrial
profitability are simulated. Finally, we examine the robustness of the results with respect to the
electricity generation efficiency and price elasticity of electricity demand.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
literature. Section 3 builds game models in the coal and electricity industry chain. Equilibrium
outcomes of electricity regulation model and electricity deregulation model are compared in this
section. Section 4 provides numerical simulation and sensitivity analysis using the empirical data
in coal and electricity industries. Finally, Section 5 concludes the study by providing policy
recommendations.

2. Literature review
As the world’s biggest energy consumer (BP, 2016), China’s power industry development and
the associated market-oriented reforms have always been important research topics for energy
analysts. Zhang and Heller (2004) examined the interaction of the political, legal and economic
factors that affect China’s restructuring in the electricity systems, and reviewed the history, fuel
structure and transmission in the power industry. Ngan (2010) reviewed the three main stages of
China’s electricity reforms, including power investment financing, the separation between
government and power enterprises and the division between power generation firms and power
grids, and pointed out the necessity of further regulatory change. Wang and Chen (2012) indicated
that China’s power industry had transformed from absolute monopoly to then relative monopoly.
If the relative monopoly remains unchanged, the public welfare would be hurt.
From the perspective of coal-fired power industry, many studies pointed out the problems
existed in the regulation and the urgent need to further market-oriented reform. Wang (2007)
examined the pricing policies and the transaction relationship between the coal and power
industries in China and found that a stable, reasonable and transaction cost-saving relationship
between these two industries is hard to establish due to the excessive intervention of government.
By using the Data Envelopment Analysis-Slack Based Measure (DEA-SBM) method, Mou (2014)
studied the efficiency of China’s coal-fired power plants and showed that the coal-electricity
efficiency disparity across provinces is obvious and long-lasting. By conducting a nationwide
3
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survey on the economics of coal power, Zhao et al. (2017) concluded that the recent boom of
coal-fired power investment is absurd in many perspectives, which is largely the aftermath of the
uncompleted market reform in the power sector.
The achievements of the market-oriented reform in the power industry have also been
documented in a series of studies. Zhao et al. (2012) pointed out that the governance reforms
successfully ended the significant social welfare losses due to the severe power shortages of the
previous three decades by introducing competition and encouraging technological progress. Zhao
and Ma (2013) focused on the unbundling reform on the integrated electricity utility and explored
the impacts on the operational efficiency for 34 large power plants during 1997–2010. Results
showed that the reform had boosted productivity of China’s large utility power plants. Besides the
unbundling reform, Ma and Zhao (2015) further showed that technology mandates contributed to
at least half of the observed efficiency improvement. In Chan et al. (2017), the empirical study
from 1991 to 2005 showed that the restructuring of electricity market had brought nearly 15
percent savings in operating expenses and up to 7.5 percent emissions reduction among the
investigated power plants.
The above research was conducted based mainly on computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model, input-output (IO) model or other empirical methodologies. Game theory, another potential
method, has also been used to study the market-oriented reform of the power industry. For
example, Kemfert et al. (2002) constructed game models between electricity firms to examine the
economic effects of the liberalization of the German electricity market, and characterized the
differences between oligopolistic market and complete competitive market. Lise et al. (2006)
extended Kemfert’ model to study the electricity market liberalization of eight Northwestern
European countries, and found that a reduction in the market power of large producers may be
beneficial for both consumers and the environment. Using Lise’s model, Kamiński (2011) studied
the liberalization of Polish’s power industry under five scenarios and eight cases. Results showed
that under the competitive scenario the average electricity price would be approximately 14.7
percent lower and the production would be 6.7 percent higher than the benchmark scenario.
There are also attempts to extend the research scope from solely the electricity market to its
upstream segments, especially the coal industry. For example, some studies examined the vertical
cooperation between the coal and power producers (Yu, 2006; Wu, 2008; Yang, 2008; Zhao and Qi,
2007, 2008; Zhang, 2015), while others analyzed their price and output strategies (Shafie-khah et
al., 2013; Srinivasan et al., 2016; Zhang and Zhang, 2013). Nevertheless, less attention has paid to
the electricity reform and its impacts on both the coal and power industries.
To fill the research gap, our paper focuses on the impacts of electricity deregulation reform
on the coal-electricity industry chain. The coal and power industries’ strategic behaviors and best
responses, such as pricing and quantity decisions, are examined. Specifically, under the two
situations of low and high regulatory electricity prices, we first construct two-stage dynamic game
models connecting the coal industry and the coal-fired power industry, and analyze the best
responses of the two game players. By applying empirical data to the equilibrium outcomes, we
then examine the influence of electricity deregulation on the two industries in terms of trading
price, traded volume, and industrial profitability.

3. Game model in coal and electricity industry chain
4
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3.1 Model settings
The electricity and coal markets in China are so complex that analysts usually have to
simplify or idealize the economic connections to concentrate on the main research questions. The
objective of this study is to examine the impact of electricity deregulation on the coal and power
industries. Therefore, we only examine the essential competitive and cooperative relationships at
the industry level, without missing important market factors. On this basis, our paper establishes
industry-level game model: the coal production industry produces and sells coal to the coal-fired
power industry, which generates electricity and sells it to end users through the grid companies.
The long-lasting coal shortage situation in China ended in 2009 and the country has since had
oversupply in its coal market (Liu et al., 2017; NBS, 2016). According to the 2018 premier’s
report on the work of the government, easing overcapacity and closing down outdated coal
production facilities are still tasks with priorities (Xinhua, 2018). In addition, the China Electricity
Coal Index (CECI), which aims to objectively reflect coal procurement costs from the power
generation-side, has been adopted into the pricing mechanism for mid- and long-term coal supply
contract since 2018 (Xinhua, 2017). The new pricing mechanism exhibits a rising pricing power of
coal-fired electricity industry. In this background, we consider the utility coal market as a buyer’s
market and assume that the coal-fired power industry is the price maker. The dynamic game model
includes two stages. In the first stage, the coal-fired power industry (which is assumed to be a
coalition of all coal-fired power plants) decides the utility coal price 𝑝𝑝1 and the electricity
generation amount 𝑞𝑞2 . If electricity price is regulated, the price is considered as public information
to all players throughout the whole gaming period. If electricity price has been deregulated, a
uniform price will be determined by the coal-fired power generators in this stage. In the second
stage, the coal industry (which is also assumed to be a coalition of all the utility coal producers)
decides the utility coal output 𝑞𝑞1 , with the utility coal price as known information. Utility coal
purchase agreement will be signed between the coal and coal-fired power industries after both
stages.
For the utility coal producers, assume that the supply of coal in the market is 𝑞𝑞1, and the
mining cost is 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑎1 𝑞𝑞12 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑐𝑐1, where 𝑐𝑐1 is the fixed cost, and 𝑎𝑎1 and 𝑏𝑏1 are parameters
related to the variable cost. For the coal-fired power industry, we assume that the electricity
generation amount is 𝑞𝑞2 and the cost of electricity generation is 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 = 𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 , in which
𝑐𝑐2 is the fixed cost, and 𝑎𝑎2 and 𝑏𝑏2 are parameters related to the variable cost. To simplify the
model, we assume that one ton of standard coal can generate 𝑡𝑡 times ten thousand kilowatt hours
of electricity, which is 𝑞𝑞2 = 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞1 . Here 𝑡𝑡 is the parameter to reflect power generation efficiency.
Electricity has become an indispensable necessity that powers our society. However, as a
typical normal commodity, the higher the electricity price, the lower its market demand will be. In
this study, we assume that the market demand 𝑞𝑞 is a linear function of the electricity sales price
(retail price) 𝑝𝑝2 , which gives 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 . Here 𝑄𝑄 is the demand when electricity is free of
charge and 𝑘𝑘 is the price sensitivity. It is important to note that there is a gap between the
electricity sales price paid by users and that received by the power generators (i.e., the on-grid
electricity price), which consists mainly of the transmission and distribution fee and taxes. Assume
that the gap is uniform for each unit of electricity used, which is denoted as 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 , then the on-gird
electricity price is 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 .
Based on the above model settings, the profit function of the coal industry is:
(1)
𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎1 𝑞𝑞12 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑐𝑐1 )
5
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The profit function of the coal-fired power industry is:
𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 = (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 , 𝑞𝑞2 ] − 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 )

(2)

3.2 Electricity regulation model
We proceed backwards to derive the equilibrium of the two-stage dynamic game model. In
the second stage, given the coal price 𝑝𝑝1 , the coal industry decides on the supply amount 𝑞𝑞1 to
maximize its profit.
Max 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎1 𝑞𝑞12 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑐𝑐1 )
We first take derivation with respect to 𝑞𝑞1. According to the first order condition, the best

response function of the coal-fired power industry is 𝑞𝑞1 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

.

In the second stage, the coal-fired power industry decides on the electricity generation
amount 𝑞𝑞2. If 𝑞𝑞2 is lower than 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞1 , then the coal-fired power industry has incentive to provide a
lower price quotation of coal, which allows the coal-fired power industry to purchase sufficient
coal with lower cost. Otherwise, if 𝑞𝑞2 is higher than 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞1 , the coal-fired power industry will tend
to reduce the planned electricity generation amount or provide a higher coal price to get sufficient
coal supply. Therefore, in the equilibrium 𝑞𝑞2 will be equal to the amount of the electricity
generated by the coal supply 𝑞𝑞1 , i.e., 𝑞𝑞2 = 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞1 . Thus, based on the best response of the coal-fired
power industry 𝑞𝑞1 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

, the electricity generation amount is 𝑞𝑞2 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

𝑡𝑡.

The aim of the coal-fired power industry is to maximize its profit by adjusting the coal price

𝑝𝑝1 .

Max 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 = (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 , 𝑞𝑞2 ] − 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 )
In the situation of electricity regulation, the electricity sales price is regulated by the
government. In this study, two scenarios will be analyzed: Scenario S1 with a low electricity sales
price; and Scenario S2 with a high electricity sales price.
3.2.1 Scenario S1 with a low electricity sales price
In this scenario, the regulated electricity sales price is so low that electricity demand is larger
than the electricity generation amount chosen by the power industry. On this basis, we have
𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 > 𝑞𝑞2 and part of the market demand will not be satisfied. The profit function of the
power industry is converted as follows.
(3)
Max 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 = (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑞𝑞2 − 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 )
Substituting 𝑞𝑞1 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

and 𝑞𝑞2 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

𝑡𝑡 into Eq. (3), we take derivation with respect to 𝑝𝑝1 .

According to the first order condition, we get the optimal coal price 𝑝𝑝1∗ =
In the equilibrium, the coal supply amount is 𝑞𝑞1∗ =

generation
is 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐∗ =

amount

is 𝑞𝑞2∗ =

((𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏1 −𝑏𝑏2 𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡
4𝑎𝑎1 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

.

The

𝑎𝑎2 𝑏𝑏1 𝑡𝑡 2 +𝑎𝑎1 (𝑏𝑏1 +(𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 −𝑏𝑏2 )𝑡𝑡)

(𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏1 −𝑏𝑏2 𝑡𝑡
4𝑎𝑎1 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

profit

of

2𝑎𝑎1 +𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

, and the electricity
the

𝑎𝑎1 �𝑏𝑏12 +2𝑏𝑏1 (𝑏𝑏2 −(𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 ))𝑡𝑡+�𝑏𝑏22 −16𝑎𝑎2 𝑐𝑐1 −2𝑏𝑏2 (𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )+(𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )2 �𝑡𝑡 2 �−16𝑎𝑎12 𝑐𝑐1 −4𝑎𝑎22 𝑐𝑐1 𝑡𝑡 4
,
4(2𝑎𝑎1 +𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2 )2
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coal

industry

and the profit of
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the coal-fired power industry is 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒∗ =

𝑏𝑏12 −8𝑎𝑎1 𝑐𝑐2 +2𝑏𝑏1 (𝑏𝑏2 −(𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 ))𝑡𝑡+�𝑏𝑏22 −4𝑎𝑎2 𝑐𝑐2 −2𝑏𝑏2 (𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )+(𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )2 �𝑡𝑡 2
8𝑎𝑎1 +4𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

.

It is clear that the equilibrium outcomes are functions of the regulated electricity sales price.

In this scenario S1 with a low electricity sales price, 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 > 𝑞𝑞2∗ =

((𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏1 −𝑏𝑏2 𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡
4𝑎𝑎1 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

. With the

generation amount 𝑞𝑞2∗ , the power industry actually expects a higher sales price to reduce the gap
between the potential market demand and its supply level. When there is an alternative regulated
price to balance the supply and demand, which is 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 = 𝑞𝑞2∗ =
the price threshold ���
𝑝𝑝2 =

((𝑝𝑝2 −𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏1 −𝑏𝑏2 𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡
4𝑎𝑎1 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑄𝑄+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 +(𝑏𝑏2 +𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑄𝑄)𝑡𝑡)

, we obtain

. In scenario S1, the regulated sales price of

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2

electricity is lower than ���,
𝑝𝑝2 i.e., 𝑝𝑝2 < 𝑝𝑝
���.
2

3.2.2 Scenario S2 with a high electricity sales price
In this scenario, the electricity sales price is so high that some users will conserve the usage
of electricity. The coal-fired power industry has to generate the amount equal to the level of
market demand, despite that the marginal revenue (on-grid price) is still higher than the marginal
production cost. According to the discussion in scenario S1, the condition for scenario S2 will be
the opposite, which is 𝑝𝑝2 > 𝑝𝑝
���.
2
On this basis, we have 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 = 𝑞𝑞2 and the profit function of the power industry is
converted as 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 = (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )(𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 ) − 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 ).
Substituting 𝑞𝑞1 =

coal price 𝑝𝑝1∗ =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

and 𝑞𝑞2 =

−2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 +2𝑎𝑎1 Q+𝑏𝑏1 𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

.

𝑡𝑡 into the formula 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 = 𝑞𝑞2 , we get the optimal

In the equilibrium, the coal supply amount is 𝑞𝑞1∗ =

𝑄𝑄−𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2
𝑡𝑡

amount is 𝑞𝑞2∗ = 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 . The profit of the coal industry is 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐∗ =
of

the

is 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒∗ =

coal-fired

, and the electricity generation

𝑎𝑎1 (𝑄𝑄−𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 )^2 − 𝑐𝑐1 𝑡𝑡 2

power

𝑡𝑡 2

, and the profit
industry

−2𝑎𝑎1 (𝑄𝑄−𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 )2 +𝑡𝑡 (−𝑐𝑐2 𝑡𝑡 + (𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑄𝑄) (𝑏𝑏1 + (𝑏𝑏2 +𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 − (1 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘) 𝑝𝑝2 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝑄𝑄) 𝑡𝑡))

.

𝑡𝑡 2

In scenario S2, the optimal electricity generation amount is determined by the regulated
electricity sales price.

3.3 Electricity deregulation model
The response of the utility coal industry to the coal price 𝑝𝑝1 is the same as that in the
electricity regulation model, which means that the coal supply amount 𝑞𝑞1 will be decided to
maximize the coal industry’s profit.
Max 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎1 𝑞𝑞12 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑐𝑐1 )
Therefore, the best-response quantities of the coal industry and the coal-fired power industry
are the same as those in the electricity regulation model as 𝑞𝑞1 =
The profit function of the coal-fired power industry is

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

and 𝑞𝑞2 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

𝑡𝑡.
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𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 = (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 , 𝑞𝑞2 ] − 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎2𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 )
(4)
Despite that the profit function appears to be the same in the electricity regulation and
deregulation models, there is an important difference between the two models, i.e., the electricity
sales price is exogenous in the regulation model but endogenous in the deregulation model. In the
deregulation model, if the electricity sales price 𝑝𝑝2 at a given point of time is so low that the
market demand is higher than the generation amount, which means 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 > 𝑞𝑞2 (the final sales
amount is 𝑞𝑞2 ), then the power industry has incentive to increase the electricity sales price and
obtain a higher profit. Therefore, 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 > 𝑞𝑞2 will not be a stable equilibrium. On this basis,
we have 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 ≤ 𝑞𝑞2 and the profit function of the power industry is converted as follows.
(5)
Max 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 = (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )(𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 ) − 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 )
Subject to 𝑞𝑞2 − (𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 ) ≥ 0
The Lagrangian expression of the power industry’s objective function is
𝐿𝐿 = (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 )(𝑄𝑄 − 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 ) − 𝑝𝑝1 𝑞𝑞1 − (𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞22 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑐𝑐2 ) + λ(𝑞𝑞2 − 𝑄𝑄 + 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 ) (6)
Here λ is Lagrange multiplier. Substituting 𝑞𝑞1 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

and 𝑞𝑞2 =

𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏1
2𝑎𝑎1

𝑡𝑡 into Eq. (6), we

take derivation with respect to 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2 . The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimization
conditions are as follows.
∂𝐿𝐿

∂𝑝𝑝1

=

∂𝐿𝐿

∂𝑝𝑝2

𝑎𝑎2 (𝑏𝑏1 −𝑝𝑝1 )𝑡𝑡 2 +𝑎𝑎1 (𝑏𝑏1 −2𝑝𝑝1 −𝑏𝑏2 𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
2𝑎𝑎1 2

=0

(7)

= 𝑄𝑄 + 𝑘𝑘(−2𝑝𝑝2 + 𝜆𝜆) + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘 = 0

(8)

(9)
λ(𝑞𝑞2 − 𝑄𝑄 + 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 ) = 0
λ≥0
(10)
The above mathematical problem can be solved through discussing two scenarios.
Scenario 1): 𝑞𝑞2 − 𝑄𝑄 + 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 = 0 and λ > 0. After calculating the equilibrium outcomes, we

obtain 𝜆𝜆 =

2𝑎𝑎1 (𝑄𝑄−𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘)+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 +(𝑏𝑏2 −𝑎𝑎2 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑎𝑎2 𝑄𝑄)𝑡𝑡)
2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2

condition of the optimization.
Scenario 2): 𝑞𝑞2 − 𝑄𝑄 + 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2 > 0
𝑎𝑎1 𝑏𝑏1 −𝑎𝑎1 𝑏𝑏2 𝑡𝑡+𝑎𝑎2 𝑏𝑏1

𝑝𝑝1∗ =

2𝑎𝑎1 +𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

𝑡𝑡 2

and 𝑝𝑝2∗ =

𝑄𝑄+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘
2𝑘𝑘

, which is positive and satisfies the non-negativity

λ=0 .

and

. 𝑞𝑞2∗ − 𝑄𝑄 + 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝2∗ = −

The

equilibrium

outcomes

are

2𝑎𝑎1 (𝑄𝑄−𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘)+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 +(𝑏𝑏2 −𝑎𝑎2 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑎𝑎2 𝑄𝑄)𝑡𝑡)

< 0,

4𝑎𝑎1 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑡𝑡 2

which does not satisfy the non-negativity condition of the optimization. Therefore, only the first
scenario holds.

sales

In the equilibrium, the coal price is 𝑝𝑝1∗ =

is 𝑞𝑞1∗ =

profit

is 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐∗ =
the

is 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒∗ =

price

is

𝑝𝑝2∗ =

𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄−𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘−𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘−𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+2𝑡𝑡 2 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 2

𝑏𝑏1 (1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 +𝑎𝑎1 (𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑄𝑄−𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘−𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
2𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )

.

The

coal

, and the electricity generation amount is 𝑞𝑞2∗ =
of

the

coal

and the electricity
supply

amount

𝑡𝑡(𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄−𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘−𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘−𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)
4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+2𝑡𝑡 2 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 2

industry

�𝑎𝑎1 �𝑏𝑏12 −16𝑎𝑎1 𝑐𝑐1 �𝑘𝑘 2 +2𝑎𝑎1 𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘−𝑄𝑄)𝑡𝑡+𝑎𝑎1 (−16𝑐𝑐1 𝑘𝑘(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)+(−𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘−𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄)2 )𝑡𝑡 2 −4𝑐𝑐1 (1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)2 𝑡𝑡 4 �

profit

of

4(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )2

the

coal-fired

. The

power

, and

industry

𝑏𝑏12 𝑘𝑘 2 −8𝑎𝑎1 𝑐𝑐2 𝑘𝑘 2 +2𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘−𝑄𝑄)𝑡𝑡+(−4𝑐𝑐2 𝑘𝑘(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)+(−𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘−𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄)2 )𝑡𝑡 2
.
4𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )
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3.4 Comparison of equilibrium outcomes
By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the electricity deregulation and regulation models,
we then examine the impact of electricity reform on the coal and power industries.
Proposition 1 Under scenario S1 with a low regulated electricity sales price,
(1) The regulated electricity sales price 𝑝𝑝2 is lower than the threshold
𝑝𝑝
���2 =

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑄𝑄+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 +(𝑏𝑏2 +𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 +2𝑎𝑎2 𝑄𝑄)𝑡𝑡)
4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2

, a level with the market supply and demand to be balanced.

After the deregulation, the equilibrium sales price will be higher than ���.
𝑝𝑝2
(2) If the regulated electricity sales price is sufficiently low, which means 𝑝𝑝2 < ���
𝑝𝑝2 =
2𝑎𝑎1 𝑄𝑄+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 +(𝑏𝑏2 +𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 +𝑎𝑎2 𝑄𝑄)𝑡𝑡)
2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2

, then after the deregulation the coal price, the coal traded amount and

the electricity generation amount will all increase. If the regulated price satisfies ���
𝑝𝑝2 < 𝑝𝑝2 <
𝑝𝑝
���,
2 then after the deregulation the coal price, the coal traded amount and the electricity
generation amount will all decrease.
According to Proposition 1, after eliminating the regulation, the electricity sales price will go
up. The coal price and the traded amount may either increase or decrease, depending on the
previously regulated electricity sales price. When the regulated price is sufficiently low, the
electricity industry is willing to generate more to meet the potential market demand. Therefore, the
coal traded amount and the electricity generation amount will go up. With the power industry as
the price maker of coal, the coal industry will provide more with a higher coal price. When the
regulated price is sufficiently high, the actual generation amount has almost met the potential
market demand under the electricity regulation. After the reform, the increase in the electricity will
cause a decrease in electricity usage, so the coal traded amount and the electricity generation
amount will drop, which is accompanied by a decrease in the coal price.
Proposition 2 Under the scenario S2 with a high electricity sales price,
(1)
If
the
regulated
price
is
very
high,
which
means
that
𝑝𝑝2 >

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
,
2𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )

then after the deregulation the electricity sales price

will decrease, the electricity generation amount and coal traded amount will increase, and the
coal price will go up.

(2) If the regulated price satisfies that ���
𝑝𝑝2 < 𝑝𝑝2 <

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
,
2𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )

then after

deregulation the electricity sales price will increase, the electricity generation amount and
coal trading amount will decrease, and the coal price will drop down.
According to Proposition 2, the change of electricity sales price is determined by the
regulated price level. Under the regulation, the power industry only generates the electricity to
meet the market demand with high willingness to pay. Under the deregulation, the power industry
will optimize its decisions to maximize its profit in the market environment.
To sum up, we combine the results shown in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, and obtain the
following Proposition 3. There are three intervals of the regulated electricity sales price which
influence the impact of electricity price deregulation.
Proposition 3
(1) The low interval is 𝑝𝑝2 < ���
𝑝𝑝2 .
9
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If the regulated electricity sales price is very low, which means 𝑝𝑝2 < ���
𝑝𝑝2 , then after the
reform the electricity sales price will rise, the coal price will rise, and the coal traded
amount and the electricity generation amount will increase.
(2) The medium interval is 𝑝𝑝
���2 < 𝑝𝑝2 <
If

the

regulated

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
.
2𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )

electricity

sales

price

satisfies

that

4𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
���
𝑝𝑝2 < 𝑝𝑝2 < 1
, then after the deregulation the electricity
𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )
2𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1

2

sales price will increase, the coal price will drop down, and the electricity generation
amount and coal traded amount will decrease.
(3) The high interval is 𝑝𝑝2 >

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
.
2𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )

If the regulated electricity sales price satisfies that 𝑝𝑝2 >

4𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏1 𝑘𝑘+(𝑏𝑏2 𝑘𝑘+𝑄𝑄+2𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡)
,
2𝑘𝑘(2𝑎𝑎1 𝑘𝑘+(1+𝑎𝑎2 𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 2 )

then after the reform the electricity sales price will decrease, the coal price will rise, and
the coal traded amount and the electricity generation amount will increase.

4 Numerical simulation and sensitivity analysis
Based on the above theoretical analysis, we further study the empirical impact of China
electricity price deregulation on the utility coal and coal-fired power industries through numerical
simulation.
The parameters of the cost functions of the coal and coal-fired power industries are estimated
based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using empirical industrial data. The national
average electricity sales price is estimated according to the provincial prices and sales amounts
data. The power generation efficiency is calculated based on the average consumption rate of
standard coal. Finally, estimations of the parameters can be obtained as 𝑎𝑎1 = 0.00045671, 𝑏𝑏1 =
207.33, 𝑐𝑐1 = 0, 𝑎𝑎2 = 0, 𝑏𝑏2 = 369, 𝑐𝑐2 = 25019488, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 3214, 𝑡𝑡 = 0.3497, 𝑄𝑄 = 84604.12,
𝑘𝑘 = 3.72 (see the Appendix for more detailed explanation).
Figure 1 shows the electricity generation amount under different levels of regulated sales
price. In Scenario S1 with a low electricity sales price, as the regulated sales price rises, the
deregulated electricity generation amount is initially higher and then lower than the regulated level.
In Scenario S2 with a high electricity sales price, as the regulated sales price goes up, the
deregulated electricity generation amount is initially lower and then higher than the regulated level.
Figure 1 also show the three intervals of the regulated electricity sales price obtained in the
Proposition 3. For the low interval, after the reform the electricity sales price will rise, and the
electricity generation amount will increase. For the medium interval, after the reform the
electricity sales price will rise, and the electricity generation amount will decrease. For the high
interval, after the reform the electricity sales price will decrease, and the electricity generation
amount will increase.
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Figure 1. The electricity generation amount at different levels of regulated sales price
For example, assume that the regulated electricity sales price is 5000 (RMB/ten thousand
kWh), which is higher than ���
𝑝𝑝2 = 4677.84. Therefore, according to Section 3.4, after the
deregulation the electricity sales price will increase, the coal price will decrease, the coal traded
amount and the electricity generation amount will decrease. Our numerical simulation outcomes
shown in Table 1 confirm the above results. In addition, the results also show that the deregulation
will reduce the profit of the coal industry but increase that of the electricity industry. But the extra
gain of the electricity industry exceeds the loss that the coal industry would bear, which results in
a net benefit to the whole industry chain.
Table 1. An example of numerical simulation with the electricity sales price to be regulated at
5000 (RMB / ten thousand kWh)
Under regulation

Deregulation

Coal price (RBM/ton)

351.42

295.10

Coal traded amount (Million tons)

1578

961

Electricity sales price (RMB/kWh)
Electricity generation amount
(Billion kWh)
The profit of the coal industry
(Billion RMB)
The profit of electricity industry
(Billion RMB)

0.50

1.37

5517

3360

113.66

42.17

-22.87

2869.21

Based on the parameters in the numerical simulation, we next examine the static analysis of
equilibrium outcomes with respect to the electricity generation efficiency and the price sensitivity
of electricity demand.
11
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Proposition 4
(1) In the situation of electricity regulation with Scenario S1,

𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1∗

(2) In the situation of electricity regulation with Scenario S2,

𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1∗

∂𝑝𝑝1∗
∂k

< 0,

∂𝑞𝑞1∗
∂k

< 0.

(3) In the situation of electricity deregulation,
∂𝑝𝑝1∗
∂k

< 0,

∂𝑞𝑞1∗
∂k

< 0,

∂𝑝𝑝2∗
∂k

< 0 and

∂𝑞𝑞2∗
∂k

< 0.

𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

< 0,

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

> 0,

< 0,

< 0,

𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

> 0 and

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

∂t

𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1∗

𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

< 0,

∂𝑞𝑞2∗

< 0 and

∂𝑞𝑞2∗
∂t

> 0.

= 0, and
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

> 0;

According to Proposition 4, in Scenario S1 with a low electricity sales price, as the electricity
generation efficiency rises (a higher 𝑡𝑡), the coal price will go up, both the coal traded amount and
the electricity generation amount will increase. This is because in this scenario the potential
market demand is large and there is a considerable room for the power industry to generate more.
With a higher generation efficiency, the generation cost of unit electricity will be lower. The power
industry redoes its cost-benefit analysis and expects to purchase more coal. With a stronger
demand from the downstream, the coal industry will raise the coal price. In the Scenario S2 with a
high electricity sales price, the electricity generation amount is equal to the demand at the
regulated sales price. With a certain electricity generation amount and a higher generation
efficiency, the coal usage amount will be lower and the coal trading price will have to be lower
too.
As the electricity generation efficiency rises, the coal price and traded amount change
differently in the two scenarios. Figure 2 shows the change of the coal trading price if the
electricity generation efficiency increases by 10% on the basis of that in Figure 1. In the Scenario
S1, the coal price increase in the Scenario S1, and decreases in the Scenario S2.

Figure 2. The change of the coal trading price under Scenarios S1 and S2 if the electricity
generation efficiency increases by 10%
After relaxing the regulation, as the electricity generation efficiency rises, the generation
amount, which is equal to market demand, will be higher and the sales price will be lower. Few
coal will be used and then the coal trading price is decreased.
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As the price sensitivity of electricity demand decreases (a lower 𝑘𝑘), the electricity demand
will go up in the regulated situation with Scenario S2 and the deregulated situation. Therefore, the
electricity generation amount will be higher. With a stronger demand in the downstream, the coal
industry will charge a higher trading price. In the deregulated situation, the electricity sales price
will be raised too.

5. Conclusions
As a heritage of the planned economy system, the electricity tariff in China has been heavily
regulated. The regulated price mechanism attracts much criticism, because of its incapability to
optimize the allocation of resources in the power industry, which leads to deadweight loss to the
economy. Recognizing the negative effect of the current price mechanism, China has launched an
unprecedented marketization reform on its power industry to deregulate the electricity sales price.
Our paper aims to assess the impact of the electricity price reform in the industry level.
As the integral parts of coal-electricity industry chain, the upstream coal production industry
and the downstream power industry not only cooperate but also game with each other, which is
reflected on the coal trading price and traded quantity. Based on that, our study constructs
two-stage dynamic game models between the two industries and analyzes how they will react to
the deregulation of price mechanism. Using the game models, we compare the equilibriums with
and without electricity regulation, and examine the changes in the electricity sales price,
generation amount, the coal trading price and coal traded volume after deregulation. Our
theoretical analyses suggest that the impact of electricity price deregulation depends on whether
the regulated price is in a high or low level. Next, empirical data are collected to estimate the
parameters in the game model and simulate numerically the influence of electricity deregulation
on industries in terms of trading price, traded volume, and industrial profitability. Finally, we
perform the static analysis of equilibrium with respect to the electricity generation efficiency and
the price sensitivity of electricity demand.
Our theoretical results suggest that the actual regulated electricity price falls within the
medium interval of the theoretical results, which means that the price deregulation will result in
higher electricity sales price, lower coal price, less coal trade and less electricity generation. Based
on the current electricity price level, empirical analyses of our study show that the deregulation
will reduce the profit of the coal industry but increase that of the electricity industry. But the extra
gain of the electricity industry exceeds the loss of the coal industry, leading to a net benefit to the
whole industry chain. However, since industry structure varies significantly from place to place,
the gain and loss are distributed unevenly among different provinces. Nevertheless, our results
imply that, with appropriate mechanism design to redistribute the impact between the coal and
electricity industry and between different regions, the price deregulation reform has potential to
make the whole society better off.
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Appendix
The parameters of the cost functions of the coal and coal-fired power industries are estimated
based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using empirical industrial data collected
from the companies listed on China’s stock market. We assume that the regression results on the
data of these companies can represent the industry averages, which will be used in our numerical
simulation. Functions are obtained as follows.
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There are 15 listed companies (stock codes: 000968, 600123, 600188, 600395, 600397,
600403, 600508, 600714, 601001, 601088, 601225, 601666, 601699, 601898 and 900948)
reported their utility coal output and cost in 2016, which contributed to 37.35 percent of the
country’s utility coal consumption.
To simplify calculation, the following assumptions are made: (1) all the utility coal consumed
by coal-fired power plants is domestically produced; (2) the cost distribution of the listed
companies is representative of the whole utility production industry; (3) the cost reported by the
utility coal producers is variable cost; (4) the short-run supply curve of coal (which is also the
curve between coal output and variable cost) is linear. Therefore, the supply curve of coal can be
obtained by applying the OLS regression using the variable cost and output data as 𝑃𝑃 =
0.00091343𝑄𝑄 + 207.33 with 𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.6067, where the units of 𝑄𝑄 and 𝑃𝑃 are ten thousand tons
and ten thousand RMB. Thereafter, the overall cost function of the utility cost industry can be
obtained by integrating the supply curve to 𝐶𝐶 = 207.33𝑄𝑄 + 0.00045671𝑄𝑄2.
China has more than one thousand coal-fired power plants with an overall installed capacity
of 1.05TW in 2016. In this study, we introduce the concept of standard power plant, which means
the average unit capacity of 600MW coal-fired power plant as the dominant type of newly
constructed plants in China. We treat the coal-fired power generation industry as an integration of
1756 standard power plants in order to simplify the calculation. The cost function of each of the
standard power plant can be calculated based on the parameters from Zhao et al. (2017) and the
overall cost function of the industry can be obtained as the sum of the cost functions of all the
1756 plants, which is 𝐶𝐶 = 369𝑞𝑞2 + 25014369.
According
to
China’s
National
Energy
Administration
(2017,
http://www.nea.gov.cn/2017-01/16/c_135986964.htm), 𝑡𝑡 is 312 gsc/kWh for all coal-fired power
plants with installed capacity over 6MW.
The demand curve of electricity for the whole society is assumed to be linear. In 2016, the
residential and non-residential electricity consumption for China are 805.4 GWh and 5114.4 GWh.
Kamerschen and porter (2004) estimate the price demand elasticities of residential and industrial
users as -0.9325 and -0.3499, respectively. By assuming that all non-residential users have the
same price demand elasticity as industrial users, the overall price demand elasticity can be
calculated as -0.4292. The average electricity tariff in 2015 is 0.6826 RMB/kWh according to
China’s
National
Energy
Administration
(2016,
http://zfxxgk.nea.gov.cn/auto92/201611/t20161101_2312.htm). When no updated information is
available, this tariff is applied in our calculation to represent the average electricity tariff in 2016.
Therefore, the demand curve of electricity for the Chinese society can be calculated as 𝑄𝑄 =
−3.7221𝑝𝑝2 + 84604.
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